We study an under-utilized source of data on legislative e®ectiveness, and exploit its panel structure to uncover several interesting patterns. We¯nd that e®ectiveness rises sharply with tenure, at least for the¯rst few terms, even after controlling for legislators' institutional positions, party a±liation, and other factors. E®ectiveness never declines with tenure, even out to nine terms. The increase in e®ectiveness is not simply due to electoral attrition and selective retirement, but appears to be due to learning-by-doing. We also¯nd evidence that a signi¯cant amount of \positive sorting" occurs in the legislature, with highly talented legislators moving more quickly into positions of responsibility and power. Finally, e®ec-tiveness has a positive impact on incumbents' electoral success, and on the probability of moving to higher o±ce. These¯ndings have important implications for arguments about term limits, the incumbency advantage, and seniority rule.
Introduction
Good laws do not make themselves. They require inputs of time, energy, information, and thought. Holding hearings, drafting bills, amending bills, building coalitions, and investigating executive implementation are necessary parts of the process. Who does this work in U.S. legislatures? Which legislators are especially e®ective at the job of lawmaking? What are the determinants of e®ectiveness? Do legislators become more e®ective with experience, through learning-by-doing or by investing in speci¯c human capital?
Viewed as a law-producing organization, an e±cient legislature would allocate talent to where it is needed and productive. It would also employ incentive schemes that reward lawmakers who are diligent, skilled, and e®ective. In addition, voters would play a role, by rewarding e®ective legislators with reelection. If experience is an important component of legislative e®ectiveness, then reelection is important to permit legislators to gain experience.
How e±cient are U.S. legislatures in these terms? Do more e®ective legislators win reelection more often? Do they rise more quickly to positions of power inside legislatures? What is the relative importance of e®ectiveness and other factors, such as seniority or party loyalty?
We know little about the answers to these questions, in large part because we lack measures of the relative diligence, skill, or e®ectiveness of politicians. This paper exploits data on legislator \e®ectiveness" for the North Carolina House of Representatives for the period 1977-2001, collected by the North Carolina Center for Public Policy Research (NC Center). The NC Center surveys about 500 legislators, lobbyists, and journalists at the end of each \long" legislative session, and asks them to assess how e®ective each legislator was during that session.
1 The respondents were asked to order legislators according to their work in committees and on the°oor, their general knowledge and expertise in special¯elds, their ability to in°uence the opinion of fellow legislators, and their general aptitude for the in the chamber and in important committees. This indicates that positive sorting occurs, which is what we would expect in an e±cient legislature.
Finally, e®ectiveness has a positive impact on incumbents' electoral success. Legislators who are more e®ective are less likely to be challenged and more likely to win reelection. They are also more likely to seek higher o±ce, and more likely to win such o±ce conditional on seeking it. Higher e®ectiveness also reduces the probability of retirement.
These¯ndings have important implications for term limits, the incumbency advantage, seniority rule, and political accountability. We discuss these implications in section 8.
Before proceeding, we must acknowledge two limitations of the study. First, the analysis is limited to one state, so we must be cautious in drawing general conclusions about legislatures outside of North Carolina. Many of our¯ndings are consistent with those of others studies, however, so we are willing to speculate about their broader implications. Second, although the e®ectiveness data for North Carolina is probably the best available for any legislature in the U.S., it is still based on subjective evaluations. More objective measures are clearly desirable. Unfortunately, the existing measures { such as those based on counts of bill activity, amendment activity or attendance { capture only a small part of e®ectiveness.
One way to proceed in such a situation is to identify the relationships found using di®erent measures, then focus on those that appear in study after study. Our paper could then be viewed as one small part of this broader enterprise.
Related Literature
As noted above, relatively little research has been done on the determinants or e®ects of individual legislator performance. There are, however, some notable exceptions.
Several papers use bill introduction and amendment activity to measure performance. Wawro (2000) uses sponsorship and co-sponsorship to construct \entrepreneurship" scores for all U.S. House members serving in the 94th-103rd Congresses. He¯nds that higher levels of entrepreneurial activity help Democratic representatives advance into leadership positions, but there is no e®ect for Republicans. Entrepreneurship does not appear to have a signi¯cant impact on voters' evaluations or vote choices. Schiller (1995) also uses bill sponsorship to measure entrepreneurship, and studies the U.S. Senate during the 99th and 100th Congresses. She¯nds that senior senators sponsor more bills than junior members, as do senators who hold committee chairs or are chairs of a large number of subcommittees. Hamm et al. (1983) ¯nd that leadership positions and seniority are strong predictors of legislative activity and bill success in the Texas and South Carolina state legislatures.
Other studies employ subjective measures of performance, or a mix of subjective and objective measures. One of the earliest is , who studies several determinants of \in°uence" in the Indiana state senate. More recently, Mayhew (2000) studies \prominent"
actions taken by members of the U.S. Congress over a 200-year period. He¯nds that in recent decades legislators tend to have a large amount of experience { or at least seniority { before they take prominent legislative actions. DeGregorio (1997) surveyed 97 professional interest group advocates, and asked them to identify congressional \leaders" on six key bills passed during the 100th Congress. She reports that the following variables were signi¯cant predictors of whether a representative was identi¯ed as a leader: tenure, majority party status, holding a party leadership position, and membership on policy-relevant committees.
Luttbeg (1992) studies journalists' rankings of legislators in several states, and¯nds that legislators with the highest rankings have a 12% higher probability of reelection than those with the lowest rankings. Meyer (1980) surveyed state representatives in North Carolina in 1973 to estimate the determinants of the \most in°uential" members. Mondak (1995c) and Mondak and McCurley (1995) derive measures of \integrity," \com-petence" and \quality" from content analysis of the descriptions of U.S. House members in the Almanac of American Politics and Politics in America. Mondak (1995c) ¯nds that low-quality incumbents are more likely to leave congress after a few terms, via voluntary retirement or electoral defeat. Quality also a®ects the level of challenger spending and votemargins in primary elections. These e®ects seem to be driven more by competence than integrity. McCurley and Mondak (1995) focus on the link between incumbent quality and voters' opinions as revealed in the National Election Studies. They¯nd that incumbent integrity directly in°uences both feeling thermometer scores and voting choices, while competence a®ects elections indirectly via the behavior of potential challengers.
Finally, two papers study North Carolina and use legislator e®ectiveness data from the NC Center. Weissert (1991) focuses on issue specialization, and¯nds that legislators who introduce bills on \salient" issues are rated as more e®ective than other legislators. Haynie (2002) focuses on racial discrimination, and¯nds evidence that black legislators are viewed as less e®ective than white legislators even after controlling for other factors. Both papers also¯nd that e®ectiveness increases with seniority, and that it is higher for members who hold committee chairs or chamber leadership positions, for members of the majority party, and for members who introduce more bills. Lawyers also appear to be more e®ective.
Our results add to this literature in several ways. We have much more data on legislator performance than any of the studies above except Wawro (2000) , Weissert (1991), and Haynie (2002) . Our data also do not su®er as severely from potential sample selection issues as the data of Mondak and associates, since we have data on all legislators. 4 Perhaps most importantly, we are able to follow legislators for many terms and study the dynamics of their legislative careers. Only Wawro (2000) conducts any dynamic analyses similar to ours below. This is mainly due to data limitations, of course { e.g., DeGregorio (1997) only has a snapshot of one congress, and Mondak (1995c) and McCurley and Mondak (1995) cannot construct a meaningful panel of congressional competence or integrity indices.
Data and Sources
As noted above, we study the North Carolina state legislature because it probably has the best available data on legislator e®ectiveness of any U.S. legislature.
4 They are able to assign scores on one or both attributes to 75% of the relevant sample (403 out of nearly 550). The missing congressmen are those for which neither the Almanac of American Politics nor Politics in America provided su±ciently detailed information. This is almost certainly a non-random subsample of individuals.
A Bit of Background
The North Carolina legislature is called the General Assembly. It consists of two chambers, a House of Representatives with 120 members and a Senate with 50 members. All members are elected every two years for two-year terms. The General Assembly is typically described a hybrid { an amateur, citizens' legislature with some professional characteristics.
Regular legislative sessions are biennial, convening in January following each election. In addition, there have been special sessions or short sessions in virtually every even-numbered year since 1974. In 1986-88 the North Carolina legislature was ranked 22nd by Squire's (1992) index of legislative professionalism. In 2001 legislative salaries were $13,951 plus a $104 per diem for living expenses. Legislative leaders earned substantially more { e.g., the Speaker of the House received a salary of $38,151 and an expense allowance of $16,956.
5
The Democratic Party dominated the North Carolina General Assembly until very recently. Democrats held 86% of all state legislative seats during the period 1970 -1979 , 77% during 1980 -1989 , and 61% during 1990 -1999 . In 1994 Republicans won control of the state House for the¯rst time in 100 years. They won again in 1996, but then lost in 1998.
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Internally, the legislature is organized mainly along party lines. The majority party controls all committee chairs, but some vice-chairs and subcommittee chairs go to the minority.
Electorally, party organizations in North Carolina are stronger than in most other southern states, but typically rank just below the U.S. average (see, e.g., Cotter, et al., 1984) . Morehouse (1981) classi¯ed North Carolina as a state in which pressure groups are strong.
Measuring Legislator E®ectiveness
The data on legislator e®ectiveness comes from the North Carolina Center for Public 5 Despite its character as a citizens' legislature, some observers argue that until recently the North Carolina General Assembly was one of the most powerful legislative bodies in the nation. This is due to the fact that until 1996 the governor of North Carolina had no veto.
6 The 2002 elections produced an exact 50-50 split in the House, resulting in a unique system of shared control. Democrats controlled the state Senate throughout the period under study, but with a narrow 26-24 margin during 1995-1996. Policy Research (NC Center), an independent non-partisan organization.
7 At the end of each regular legislative session after the legislature has adjourned, the NC Center asks state legislators, lobbyists and legislative liaisons, and capital news correspondents to rate the \e®ectiveness" of each member of the General Assembly. According to the NC Center:
Ratings were to be based on their participation in committee work, their skill at guiding bills through°oor debate, their general knowledge and expertise in special¯elds, the respect they command from their peers, the enthusiasm with which they execute various legislative responsibilities, the political power they e®ectiveness { thus, the highest ranked legislator in each session receives an E®ectiveness value of 120, and the lowest ranked legislator receives a value of 1.
9
Some of our analyses use the e®ectiveness rankings legislators receive at the end of their rst term of service. As noted above, this might serve as a measure of a legislator's general aptitude for legislative work. We call this E®ectiveness 1.
As noted above, the main weakness of the E®ectiveness rankings is that they are based on subjective evaluations. This disadvantage is o®set by several desirable characteristics:
Each ranking is based on a large number of evaluations; the evaluators are all legislative \specialists" of one sort or another; and the rankings are constructed in a consistent manner over a long period of time.
Two other facts about the rankings are encouraging. First, between 1977 and 1992 the NC Center reported the average evaluation that each representative received from each of the three types of respondents { legislators, lobbyists, and journalists { in addition to the overall evaluation and ranking. The correlations across the three separate scores are quite high: the correlation between the average rating by legislators and the average rating by lobbyists is .93, the correlation between the average rating by legislators and the average rating by journalists is .89, and the correlation between the average rating by lobbyists and the average rating by journalists is .91. Thus, various biases that we might imagine in the responses { e.g., lobbyists might systematically underrate legislators who oppose their positions, and legislators might systematically underrate members of the opposing party { do not appear to be a problem.
Second, the NC Center's Article II guides also contain information on the number of bills each member introduced, and how many of these became law. For representatives serving during the period 1981-2000, the correlation between E®ectiveness and the number of bills 9 The ranking reported by the NC Center is constructed as follows: Let E 1 be the average evaluation a legislator receives from legislators, let E 2 be the average evaluation the legislator receives from lobbyists, let E 3 be the average evaluation a legislator receives from journalists, and let ¹ E = (E 1 +E 2 +E 3 )=3. Legislators are ranked according to the ¹ E's. Thus, the three groups of respondents { legislators, lobbyists, and journalists { are weighted equally.
introduced is .51, and the correlation between E®ectiveness and the number of bills rati¯ed is .50. Thus, the more objective measures of activity are strongly and positively related to E®ectiveness. On the other hand, the correlation is far from 1, indicating that E®ectiveness measures something other than simply introducing and passing bills.
Another issue is that E®ectiveness is an ordinal variable, so attenuation bias may be a concern. Of course, this bias generally makes it more di±cult to¯nd statistically signi¯cant relationships, so we are not concerned that it introduces spurious correlations. Pooling the ordinal data across years could exacerbate the problem further. To address this, we include year-speci¯c¯xed e®ects in all analyses. We also include member-speci¯c¯xed memberspeci¯c e®ects in most of our analyses { thus, our identi¯cation is based mainly on changes in members' rankings over time. In addition, for a subset of years we can use the \raw" average e®ectiveness evaluations rather than rankings. These probably su®er less from the problems associated with ordinal data. Using the raw evaluations, we obtain qualitatively similar results to those reported below.
Other Variables
Our analyses require other measures as well, including election outcomes and contestation rates, party a±liations, committee assignments and leadership posts, legislative tenure, and roll call voting records. These variables are all described in Table A .1, with summary statistics given in Table A.2. Data on committee assignments, leadership posts, and tenure are from the NC Center's Article II guides and from various editions of the North Carolina Manual. These books contains a complete list of each legislator's committee assignments and major subcommittee assignments, including information about whether the member served as chairman, cochairman, vice chairman, or ranking member. In addition, the NC Center's survey provides information about the relative importance of di®erent committees. Each respondent was asked to name the¯ve or six \most powerful" committees in both houses. The most power-ful committees almost always included Appropriations, Finance, Judiciary I, and Rules, and Education from 1989 onward. In order to estimate the impact of e®ectiveness on election outcomes, we must control for the \normal vote" in each legislative district (Converse, 1966) . We use the votes cast in statewide o±ces to estimate the Normal Vote. Due to redistricting we have three di®erent sets of districts, and due to data limitations we use three slightly di®erent sets of statewide o±ces for the three periods.
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10 Other committees appeared on the list in particular years { e.g., Judiciary III in 1983 and Judiciary IV in 2001. In 1991, a redistricting year, the Redistricting committees were among the top six. Respondents were also asked to name the \most in°uential" lobbyists.
11 For 1978 For -1980 we calculate the average Democratic share of the two-party vote for governor, senator, and president, using county-level data. (Prior to 1982, no counties were split across state house districts, but larger counties elected all their state legislators at-large.) The data are from ICPSR Study Number 13. For 1982-1990 we calculate the average Democratic share of the two-party vote for all available statewide races held during the period [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] 
The Determinants of Average E®ectiveness
We begin by studying the determinants of average E®ectiveness in the legislature. Since we observe most legislators for two or more terms, the data have a panel structure. We exploit this by estimating¯xed e®ects and random e®ects models, with an individual e®ect for each legislator. The panel is unbalanced, however, so it must be treated with some care.
We address this in more detail in section 5.
From a theoretical point of view, we consider E®ectiveness as the relative \output" of a representative during a term. The production function used to generate this output employs three conceptually di®erent factors. The¯rst factor is a member's intrinsic capability or aptitude for legislative work. The main way we capture this is by using legislator-speci¯c xed e®ects. Alternatively, in some speci¯cations we use random e®ects and also include measures of some of the characteristics that common sense or previous research suggests should a®ect ability, including occupation, age, and prior service. The second factor is a member's portfolio of formal leadership positions in the legislature. Party leaders, committee chairs and vice-chairs, subcommittee chairs, and members of the most powerful committees are likely to be more e®ective at passing and blocking legislation than other legislators.
average Democratic share of the two-party vote for all statewide elected o±ces in the 2000 election. Again, we aggregated precinct-level data to the legislative district level; the precinct-level data are from the North Carolina State Board of Elections (URL: http://www.sboe.state.nc.us).
12 We obtained some of this data in reports from the NC State Board of Elections and the NC State Legislative Library, and we extracted some from the URL: http://www.sboe.state.nc.us.
Members of the majority party may also have an advantage in building winning coalitions for their proposals. The third factor is experience, which should a®ect performance through learning-by-doing or investment in skills and knowledge speci¯c to the legislature.
In Table 1 we attempt to isolate the e®ects of these three sets of variables. The table reports regression results with E®ectiveness as the dependent variable for various sub-samples.
The¯rst two columns pool all representatives present in the House from 1977 to 2001.
Columns 3-6 compare the parties' delegations. Columns 1, 3 and 5 present¯xed e®ects estimates, and columns 2, 4 and 6 contain random e®ects estimates. The Hausman specication tests typically reject the null hypothesis that the individual e®ects are orthogonal to the regressors. We report the random e®ects results nonetheless, because they allow us to gauge the impact of individual characteristics that are time invariant. The fact that the coe±cients do not vary much between the speci¯cations gives us some con¯dence that the random e®ects estimates are meaningful.
Not surprisingly, legislators who hold the top leadership posts { chamber leaders and chairs of the¯ve most powerful committees { tend to be rated among the most e®ective.
These posts are worth about 12-16 positions on the ranking scale (1-120). Other leadership posts, which include chairs of less important committees, also have signi¯cant e®ects in the range of 6-8 positions. The magnitude of these coe±cients appears somewhat higher for Republicans, which had minority status for most of the period, but the di®erences across parties are not statistically signi¯cant.
Membership in the majority party also has a large, positive impact on E®ectiveness. We can estimate this even with individual¯xed e®ects by exploiting the switches in majority party control that occurred in 1994 and again in 1998. Republicans took control following the 1994 elections, and Democrats regained control after the 1998 elections. The coe±cients show that majority party status increases a legislator's ranking by 20 positions, a large jump. This is even larger than the e®ect of becoming a chamber leader or powerful committee chair.
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13 The year coe±cients for 1994 and 1996 are signi¯cantly di®erent than the rest of coe±cients in the This¯nding deserves special attention in view of the ongoing debate about whether and how parties matter in U.S. politics. Rohde (1991) , Aldrich (1995) , Aldrich and Rohde (2000, 2001) , and others argue that members of the majority party in the U.S. Congress are advantaged due to their ability to organize the chamber. McCubbins (1993, 2002) argue that the majority party uses its power to control the legislative°oor agenda. In contrast, Krehbiel (1993 Krehbiel ( , 1998 Krehbiel ( , 1999 and others argue that the majority party in Congress has little agenda control, and that majority party status confers few policy-relevant bene¯ts.
Our¯ndings support the view that being in the majority party does matter.
14 The large e®ect of majority party status is especially interesting because North Carolina is not known as a \strong party" state. Party a±liation may have an even larger impact in other states.
The random e®ects estimates indicate that lawyers are especially e®ective legislators. Weissert (1991) found this previously. It is not surprising that lawyers are more e®ective, since legislators make laws and lawyers have years of specialized training in the theory and application of law, legal jargon, and so on. 15 What is surprising is the magnitude of the e®ect { for example, being a lawyer appears to have a larger impact on E®ectiveness than being the chair of a powerful committee.
Previous service in the state legislature only appears to matter for Democrats. This may be a consequence of the fact that Democrats had large majorities in both chambers until the late 1980s and 1990s, giving them a larger pool of candidates with prior experience. The same is true for the variable Age at Entry.
The¯rst set of variables in Table 1 captures the e®ects of experience. The coe±cients on the Tenure variables are large and highly signi¯cant in all speci¯cations. Legislators in their second term are on average 17 positions ahead of their freshmen counterparts, and legislators nineties for columns 3-6 { smaller for Democrats and larger for Republicans { indicating the presence of majority party e®ects. 14 Ansolabehere and Snyder (1999) and Cox and Magar (1999) ¯nd that majority party status matters for campaign contributions, which could be related to power.
15 An anonymous referee suggested that lawyers may be especially e®ective because they have experience in, and an a±nity for, the process of formalized dispute. In contrast, businessmen are accustomed to making unilateral, executive decisions.
in their fourth term are 30 positions ahead. Experience yields diminishing returns, and after ve terms additional experience has at best a small impact on e®ectiveness. Importantly, however, we¯nd no evidence that e®ectiveness eventually declines with tenure. Also, we never reject the hypothesis that the Tenure coe±cients are the same in both parties.
The results show the magnitude of experience e®ects is¯rst order. For example, having one term of experience is already more important than holding a powerful committee chair, and slightly less than being in the majority party. In the next section we explore the source and character of these experience e®ects.
Finally, we also ran speci¯cations analogous to those in Table 1 using the data for the NC state Senate. The results are quite similar to those for NC House. In particular, E®ectiveness rises sharply with tenure in the¯rst few terms in all speci¯cations and for all subsamples, even controlling for leadership positions. We cannot con¯dently identify the e®ect of majority party status, however, because the Senate was under Democratic control throughout the period. In the interest of space we do not present or discuss these results in detail, but they are available from the authors on request.
E®ectiveness and Tenure
The estimates in Table 1 show clearly that average relative performance in the legislature increases with experience, even controlling for institutional leadership positions, majority party status, and other factors. This increase in e®ectiveness could re°ect a real increase in legislative abilities, perhaps via learning-by-doing or perhaps through investment in speci¯c skills needed for legislative work. On the other hand, the increase might mainly re°ect selective re-election and retirements. If the electoral process is good at weeding out underperforming politicians and/or those who are not e®ective retire earlier (perhaps because they do not enjoy the job), then average performance could rise with seniority simply as a consequence of selection.
To isolate the e®ects of electoral selection and retirement, we estimate speci¯cations similar to those in Table 1 , but restrict the sample to the set of legislators¯rst elected between 1976 and 1994 who served four consecutive terms in the House of Representatives. Also, we only include the observations on the¯rst four terms served for each of these legislators. The result is a balanced panel about which we can make more meaningful conditional statements. Table 2 presents the results. Columns 1 and 2 show the same speci¯cation of Table 1 using the restricted sample. Again, we present random e®ects and¯xed e®ects estimates.
Columns 3 and 4 show¯xed e®ects estimates for each party separately.
Looking¯rst at columns 1 and 2, the estimates show clearly that conditional on serving at least four terms in the legislature, a legislator's e®ectiveness rating increases with tenure, even controlling for institutional positions. Average relative performance increases sharply between the¯rst period and the second, and again between the second period and the third; it increases again, but more gradually, from the third period to the fourth. The coe±cients from the random e®ects model are close to those in Table 1 . The coe±cients from the¯xed e®ects model imply an even steeper pro¯le. This indicates that the positive e®ect experience has on e®ectiveness is not due primarily to electoral selection and selective retirements.
Surviving legislators become more e®ective with experience.
The coe±cients on the committee leadership variables are somewhat smaller than in the unrestricted sample, but the coe±cient on Chamber Leader is larger. This might re°ect the fact that very few representatives obtain chamber leadership positions early in their legislative career. The estimated e®ect of being a member of the majority party is similar to that in the unrestricted sample.
The estimates in columns 3 and 4 suggest that tenure has a larger impact on Republicans than Democrats, but the di®erences are not statistically signi¯cant.
The nature of the experience e®ect is unclear. One possibility is that it largely re°ects a process of learning-by-doing. Legislators might acquire important knowledge and skills just by being in the General Assembly { watching how other legislators write bills and push them through the process, participating in committee hearings, mark-up sessions, and°oor debates, and so on. Another possibility is that it re°ects a costly investment decision { extra time and energy spent learning the legislative process that could be spent on other activities.
The principal di®erence between these two hypotheses is that the latter is a®ected by the incentives to invest, while the former is \automatic" and relatively costless.
To assess these two hypotheses, we separate legislators into di®erent groups that ex ante should have di®erent incentives to invest. The results of this are shown in Table 3 .
The speci¯cations presented in the table include individual¯xed e®ects (random e®ects regressions produce qualitatively similar results).
In column 1 we test whether legislators who are younger when they¯rst enter the House have steeper e®ectiveness-experience pro¯les (thus, Group = 1 for those with Age of Entry < 50, and Non-Group = 1 for those with Age of Entry¸50). Younger legislators should expect to have longer legislative careers, and may be more likely to consider the state House as a stepping-stone in their political careers. If so, they have a greater incentive to invest, and should have steeper e®ectiveness-experience pro¯les. As the coe±cients and F-statistic in the table show, however, we cannot reject that the pro¯les are the same for both groups.
Column 2 shows the results of another test. Here we compare the e®ectiveness-experience pro¯les of Democrats and Republicans in the period up to 1992. This was a period of Democratic dominance. The returns to investing in legislative skills should be higher for members of a dominant majority party, because ceteris paribus, their bills are more likely to pass. For example, over the period [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] , Democrats in the House introduced an average of 22.8 bills per legislator, 7.6 of which were rati¯ed; Republicans introduced 8.5 bills per legislator, 2.2 of which were rati¯ed. Examining Table 3 , the investment hypothesis again fares poorly. The e®ectiveness-experience pro¯les of Democrats and Republicans look similar, and the F-test does not reject the hypothesis that they are the same.
The tests above are not very strong, so we hesitate to draw strong conclusions. Tentatively, however, the evidence suggests that most of the increase in performance that comes from experience is due to learning-by-doing on the job.
Can we say anything about what legislators learn? In column 3, we test whether legislators with previous legislative service have°atter e®ectiveness-tenure pro¯les than newcomers (thus, Group = 1 for those Previous Service = 1, and Non-Group = 1 for those with Previous Service = 0). This is in fact the case, and we can reject the hypothesis that there is no di®erence between the groups at the 10% con¯dence level. Legislators with previous service begin with a higher e®ectiveness ranking than those without previous service (see Table 1 ), but their ranking grows more slowly with additional experience. The pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that the newcomers are \catching up," learning things that those with previous service have already learned. This suggests that at least part of what is learned is knowledge speci¯c to the General Assembly.
Column 4 shows yet another cut at the data. If the knowledge acquired in the legislature is related purely to technical aspects of law-making { legal jargon, the structure of existing law, etc. { then lawyers should begin with higher e®ectiveness rankings, but have°atter pro¯les, because they already possess much of this knowledge. Table 1 shows that lawyers are more e®ective, but column 4 of Table 3 
Allocating Positions of Power
In an e±cient legislature, the most talented legislators should obtain important leadership positions sooner than less talented individuals. An e±cient legislature should also allocate important positions on the basis of previous performance. How e±cient is the North Carolina House of Representatives in these terms?
To assess the¯rst of these criteria, we need a measure of \talent." We use the e®ectiveness rating a legislator receives in his or her¯rst term. This is arguably a good measure of a member's relative aptitude for legislative work, where aptitude is interpreted broadly to include skills, drive, personality, and how much the member enjoys legislative tasks. As noted above, the ranking is done at the end of the¯rst \long session" in which a legislator serves, so legislators, lobbyists and journalists have had some time to see the legislator at work. However, almost no legislators hold powerful positions in their¯rst term, so the initial ratings are not in°uenced by variations in institutional power.
We examine whether legislators with high initial e®ectiveness evaluations advance to powerful committee positions more quickly than other legislators. We focus on the dependent variable Power Committee Leader, which is 1 for the chairs, vice-chairs and subcommittee chairs of the¯ve most powerful committees in each chamber. Since this is a dichotomous variable, we run probit regressions. To control for seniority e®ects (as well as selection issues due to attrition), we estimate models for legislators with the same amount of tenure. We consider three sub-samples: legislators in their second term, those in their third term, and those in their fourth term. Table 4 presents the results. The¯rst three columns show the e®ect of increased aptitude on the probability of attaining a powerful committee position by a legislator's second, third or fourth term. For legislators in their second and third terms, E®ectiveness 1 has a signi¯cant and positive e®ect. This e®ect does not appear in the fourth term, but the sample is small.
The estimated e®ects in the second and third terms are quite large. Consider the third term.
Holding all other variables at their mean values, an increase in E®ectiveness 1 from one-half of a standard deviation below the mean to one-half of a standard deviation above the mean (24 points, in the relevant sub-sample), increases the probability a legislator is promoted to a powerful committee position from .22 to .31, a 50% increase.
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In columns 4 and 5 we examine the e®ect of previous performance on the probability of attaining a powerful committee position by a legislator's third or fourth term. The independent variable of interest in these speci¯cations is Lagged E®ectiveness (the lag is one period).
This variable is statistically and substantively signi¯cant in both the third and fourth terms.
For example, legislators with higher e®ectiveness rankings in their second term are more likely to be promoted to a powerful committee leadership positions in their third term. Interestingly, columns 3 and 5 in the table imply that although the impact of E®ectiveness 1 has faded by the fourth term, recent e®ectiveness still matters for promotions.
Clearly, we also expect seniority to be strongly related to promotions. Table 5 shows the relative importance of seniority and aptitude, where aptitude is again measured using E®ectiveness 1. We divide the sample into Low and High initial e®ectiveness categories, splitting each cohort at the median. Looking across the columns of the table, we see that seniority has a large in°uence on the probability a legislator attains a powerful committee position. Looking down the rows, we see that initial e®ectiveness also matters. In particular, having a High value of E®ectiveness 1 increases a legislator's probability of promotion by an amount that is approximately equal to one additional term of service.
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Overall, seniority dominates the internal promotion process. Since tenure is strongly related to e®ectiveness, seniority rule might actually be a good way to allocate top committee and party leadership posts. We can use our data to calculate the relative e±ciency of di®erent promotion procedures.
18 A completely random allocation of posts would produce a group of powerful committee and party leaders with an average e®ectiveness ranking of 60.0. Thē rst-best allocation { i.e. allocating posts to the legislators with the highest \intrinsic e®ectiveness" rankings { would produce an average e®ectiveness of 81.3.
19 Strict adherence to seniority rule would produce an average e®ectiveness of 72.4. In the data, the actual average e®ectiveness ranking for committee and party leaders is 73.0. Thus, seniority rule is closer to the fully e±cient outcome than to the outcome under a random allocation. The chamber does even better in practice { though not by much.
E®ectiveness and Reelection
In this section we explore whether being a more e®ective representative yields electoral or other career bene¯ts.
The heavy use of¯rst-past-the-post, multi-member districts in the North Carolina state legislature complicates the study of electoral outcomes. In addition, many races are fully or partially uncontested. Analyses with vote-share as the dependent variable must drop these cases, and doing so is likely to introduce selection bias. We therefore focus on two other electoral outcome variables: Reelected and Unopposed. We also present one tentative analysis with total votes as the dependent variable. In addition, we study two \career" variables:
Sought Higher O±ce and Retired. 20
Tables 6 contain the results for the electoral outcome variables. 21 The¯rst two columns examine whether being e®ective helps in a reelection bid. In the¯rst column the sample consists of all NC House representatives who seek reelection. In the second column we 19 To measure each legislator's \intrinsic e®ectiveness," we regress E®ectiveness on all of the variables in column 1 of Table 1 other than the Tenure variables, and take the legislator-speci¯c¯xed e®ects. Note that while this is a reasonable theoretical benchmark it is almost surely unattainable in practice.
20 It would be interesting to study the cases where a state representative runs against a state senator and we have E®ectiveness evaluations for both candidates, but there are too few such cases in our sample.
21 Two caveats must be mentioned. First, we do not have a good measure of challenger \quality," so there is some danger of omitted variable bias. Second, incumbents may retire strategically in order to avoid a probable defeat, leading to selection bias. Previous analyses of state legislative elections have ignored these issues, except possibly to note that they are potential problems (e.g., Holbrook and Tidmarch, 1991; King, 1991; Morgenstern, 1993, 1995) . restrict attention to freshmen seeking reelection, to avoid potential selection bias. In both cases E®ectiveness has a strong, positive impact on reelection. Holding all other variables at their means, a one-standard-deviation increase in E®ectiveness (34 positions) centered on the mean increases the probability of reelection from 89% to 95%. This e®ect is magni¯ed over the course of a career. For example, it translates into a 16 percentage point increase in the probability of winning three elections in a row, from 70% to 86%.
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As expected, Normal Vote has a strong e®ect as well. Most other variables are insigni¯-cant. These¯ndings are consistent with studies of congressional races, which typically¯nd that institutional positions have little independent e®ect on election outcomes.
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In columns 3 and 4 we study the probability a legislator is unopposed. The results show that higher E®ectiveness signi¯cantly decreases the chances a legislator is challenged.
24 Using the coe±cients from column 3, a one-standard-deviation increase in E®ectiveness centered at the mean reduces the probability of being challenged by 10 percentage points, from 67% to 57%. As expected, Normal Vote also has an important impact on contestation, because it reduces the chances that a challenge is successful.
We can exploit multi-member districts to study the impact of E®ectiveness on total votes, at least for a subset of cases. This is shown in the last column in Table 6 . We pool all multimember districts in the sample, and regress the total votes received by each incumbent on E®ectiveness and Tenure. We control for all other characteristics of a race by including a¯xed e®ect for each party in each district in each year. Thus, we compare the votes of equally experienced incumbents from the same party who are running against one another in the same district in the same year. The estimates imply that a one-standard deviation increase in E®ectiveness (34 positions) increases an incumbent's expected vote by about 500
votes. This represents 2% of the average vote received, or about one-third of the median incumbency advantage estimated for state legislators nationwide.
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Legislative e®ectiveness might have a larger impact on elections in North Carolina than in other states, precisely because a respected set of rankings exists. In North Carolina, the rankings are even used in campaign advertising. 26 This might explain why our¯ndings di®er from those of other scholars, such as Wawro (2000) who¯nds that bill sponsorship in the U.S. House is unrelated to reelection. Table 7 examines the impact of E®ectiveness on career decisions taken by legislators.
Columns 1 and 2 examine the e®ect of performance on the decision to retire from politics.
This e®ect appears signi¯cant for the whole sample, but not for freshmen. Interestingly, it
Age is not a good predictor of retirement, but Tenure is.
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A similar picture arises in columns 3 and 4 where we examine the impact of E®ectiveness on the decision to run for a higher o±ce (whether the bid is successful or not). The results
show that this e®ect is signi¯cant for the whole sample, but not for freshman. This points to another bene¯t of being an e®ective legislator: access to higher positions for those with progressive ambition. Overall, this set of results suggests that more e®ective legislators retire less often and seek higher o±ce with higher probability.
Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we study an under-utilized source of data on legislative e®ectiveness. The data can be used to measure both the performance and aptitude of legislators. Our analysis reveals several interesting patterns. First, legislators' e®ectiveness increase sharply during the¯rst few terms of service. This¯nding is quite robust, and holds even after controlling for institutional positions and electoral selection. The increasing performance appears to be due mainly to learning-by-doing rather than costly investment in speci¯c skills. Second, belonging to the majority party in the legislature increases legislator's performance over and 25 See King (1991) and Morgenstern (1993,1995) .
26 Informing citizens about their representatives' performance is, in fact, a goal of the NC Center. 27 This is consistent with Kiewiet and Zeng (1993) .
above access to more powerful positions (at least in the NC House of Representatives). Third,
the NC House appears to use both past performance and seniority as criteria for allocating positions of power; but, since performance increases with tenure, the system behaves closely to one governed by a pure seniority rule. Fourth, superior e®ectiveness yields electoral bene¯ts in the form of higher reelection rates and a higher probability of being unchallenged.
Also, more e®ective legislators tend to seek higher o±ces more often, and retire less quickly.
These¯ndings have important implications for arguments about term limits, the incumbency advantage, and seniority rule.
We make three comments on term limits. First, the fact that elections tend to oust ine®ective legislators more often than e®ective ones means that term limits may not be necessary as a mechanism for weeding out under-performing legislators, at least in North Mondak (1995a Mondak ( , 1995b and Petracca (1995) for a discussion of the potential e®ects of term limits on average quality of the legislature.
29 The calculation is as follows: On average, 23% of all representatives are freshmen, 20% are sophomores, 16% are in their 3rd term, 12% are in their 4th term, and 29% are in their 5th or higher term. Assign \years of e®ective experience" as follows: freshmen = 0, sophomores = 1, 3rd term = 2, 4th term or higher = 3. Then the average number of \years of e®ective experience" in the NC House is 208.6. Turning all those with 5+ terms into freshmen would reduce this to 105.3, a drop of 49.5%. Gilmour and Rothstein (1994) analyze this e®ect of term limits.
poorly written laws are likely to impose especially high social costs. It is therefore important to¯ll these positions with highly competent legislators, and having found such legislators it is costly to remove them via term limits.
Of course, our¯ndings do not establish that term limits would do more harm than good.
A thorough analysis must go much further in quantifying the costs, and must then balance these costs against the potential bene¯ts, such as the possibility that long periods of service lead legislators to adopt an inside-the-capitol view of public policies that does not re°ect the views of their constituents.
The fact that e®ectiveness rises with tenure may help account for the incumbency advantage in legislative elections. If voters care about their legislator's e®ectiveness, then there will be an electoral bias in favor of incumbents that is due simply to their accumulated experience. The fact that e®ectiveness increases steeply with experience during the¯rst few terms but then levels-o® is also broadly similar to the patterns observed in estimates of the incumbency advantage over legislators' careers. For example, Hibbing (1991) and Ansolabehere, et al. (2000) ¯nd that in the U.S. House the typical incumbent's vote grows quickly over the¯rst few election cycles but then hits a plateau.
Our results help evaluate the costs and bene¯ts of seniority rule. A system that promotes legislators to powerful positions purely on the basis of seniority is almost surely sub-optimal, because legislators have di®erent skills and preferences for legislative work. As our calculations suggest, however, since e®ectiveness grows with experience, it is reasonably e±cient to use seniority as the main criterion for promotion.
Our results also reveal an important omission in the theoretical literature on electoral accountability and selection. This large and growing body of work models the interactions between voters and politicians as a principal-agent relationship, focusing on the ability of voters to hold politicians accountable and/or choose \good" politicians. 30 None of the ex-30 See, for example, Persson and Tabellini (2000) , Chapter 4, and the cites therein. More recent work includes Ashworth (2002) , Besley and Ghatak (2003) , and Smart and Sturm (2003) .
isting models incorporate learning-by-doing by politicians. Some of these models, such as Banks and Sundaram (1993) and Ashworth (2002) , even predict that performance will diminish over politician's career. Our¯ndings suggest that the reduction in e®ort associated with the logic of career concerns is more than o®set by learning how to do legislative work, resulting in increasing performance over time.
Finally, there is much more to learn using the NC Center's data. We¯nd that prior performance helps legislators attain positions of power, but what about other factor such as party loyalty? Cox and McCubbins (1993) and others argue that party leaders in the U.S. All speci¯cations include year¯xed e®ects and individual¯xed e®ects.
Sample restricted to the¯rst four terms of all legislators elected between 1976 and 1994 who served four consecutive terms in the same chamber.
The excluded tenure category is Tenure1, so the Tenure coe±cients represent di®erences with respect to the valuation of freshmen.
The F test statistic is for the joint test of equality of the Tenure coe±cients across groups. Sample includes all legislators for which E®ectiveness 1 is observed. The¯rst number in each cell gives the fraction of legislators in that category that hold a powerful position. The second number is the standard error, reported in parentheses. The third number is the frequency of that category.
The t-statistic is for a one-sided test of the hypothesis of no di®erence between legislators with High and Low values of E®ectiveness 1. 
